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I. The Problem

1. To survey current doctrinal (ideological) warfare involving the Soviet Union and the U. S.
2. To recommend a policy for the U. S. utilization of doctrinal (ideological) warfare.
3. To define the scope of an effective doctrinal (ideological) warfare program and to establish responsibilities for its implementation.

II. Definitions and Relationships of Ideological Warfare and Psychological Warfare

4. Definitions

a. Ideology

A system of ideas, whether consciously organized or not, which explains various aspects of life, justifies the social structure, provides a ready-made meaning for human existence.

b. Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare

A planned attack against the basic hostile system conducted concurrently with a positive advocacy of basic ideas of our own system.

5. Relationships

Doctrinal (Ideological) warfare is, or should be, the central core of psychological warfare. It exposes the basic vulnerabilities of the hostile system and exploits the beneficial or favorable aspects of one's own system. It should provide the foundation on which effective propaganda could be based. In fact, propaganda which is not guided by a sound concept of ideological aspects of the struggle will invariably tend to become

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superficial and, in the long run, noneffective. It likewise should be evident that a solely negative ideological offensive would tend to produce mental vacuums. Therefore, the practitioner of ideological warfare should make it a rule to never destroy another's ideological faith without replacing it with a substitute. *wherever?*

III. The Ideological Situation

6. Ideology or Imperialism

There is no exact answer to the question as to whether or not the struggle between the democratic world and the Soviet orbit is basically an ideological one or a modern version of old style power politics. The approximately correct answer is that there is a good measure of both the ideological element and the power element in the current struggle.

7. Significance of Ideology to the Soviets

a. The validity of dialectical materialism is a matter of vital importance to the Soviet regime for several reasons.

(1) Many of the top leaders believe much of the basic theory.

(2) All are to a large extent unconsciously conditioned by it.

(3) Most of the Soviet population is conditioned by it to varying degrees.

(4) They are stuck with it. The validity and justification of everything they have done has been very carefully and deliberately tied to this foundation.

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b. The Soviet leaders, including the hard-headed Stalin, regard ideological theory as a matter of vital concern. However much opportunism there is in the Soviet hierarchy, there is adequate evidence that the "ideal goals of communism" provides the end with which they justify their own actions. Consequently, communist ideology is an integrating factor among the Soviet elite and it also provides the mental formula by which they control the Soviet masses. That communist ideology is a source of their own confidence and strength can be gleaned from their own words:

"The superiority of the Soviet world outlook over the bourgeois world point of view is a manifestation of the superiority of Socialism over capitalism. The unfailing faith of the Soviet people in the rightness of our great effort, in its final victory, comes from a correct, scientific understanding of events. . ."

c. In view of the importance which the Soviets themselves attach to their ideology, it is a regrettable fact, from our point of view, that there is at present no important ideological division in the Soviet State. In the past, Stalin has himself fabricated superficial ideological cleavages for the purpose of giving ideological justification to his purges. (Vishinsky's 1937 trial of Red Army generals provides a classic example of this technique.) Unfortunately, little has been done to keep these home-manufactured splits alive nor to insert into the Soviet system ideological cleavages from the outside.

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8. Soviet Ideology and Soviet Policy

a. There is considerable evidence that Soviet ideology plays a major part in the control and direction of both their internal domestic programs and in the shaping of their foreign policy. As an illustration, Stalin's article in Bolshevik, which appeared concurrently with the holding of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow in October 1952, has been regarded by our most qualified observers as the most significant event of the Conference. A report originating from our Embassy in Moscow, is particularly pertinent:

"Most important statement in connection with 19th Soviet Party Congress was technically not (repeat not) part of Congress itself. Stalin's work on 'Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR' overshadows statements made by principal as well as minor speakers at Congress. Congress speeches and any subsequent statements should therefore be assessed in their relationship to Stalin's writings. . . Stalin's work constituting as it does major ideological and political pronouncement and geared to relatively long-term future is different in tone from speeches made by Congress notables." (Telegram from Moscow to Secretary of State, No. 707, October 21, 1952.)

b. The Soviet leaders, and particularly Stalin, have always advocated an aggressive concept of ideological warfare!

"There can be no breathing space in ideological warfare.
On the ideological front, we must and we shall fight not by

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passive resistance but by an active and unceasing attack on our enemies; this is what the Party of Lenin and Stalin teaches."

c. To the discontented masses of the free world Communism promises a Utopian society, planned on a rational basis and designed to remove exploitation, racial and social inequalities, economic insecurity, unemployment, poverty and war. Communism's appeal has been strengthened by its apparent plausibility, its persistent self-assurance, its messianic fervor, and its constant claim to be scientific and infallible because it harmonizes with the predetermined pattern of world history. The international Communist movement has been regarded ever since 1919 as one of the basic forces to be utilized in the campaign of global expansion. International Communism can only be kept militant if the ideological core of communism remains fundamentally hostile to the concepts of the democratic West.

9. Susceptibility to Attack

a. Attacks on the basic premises of Communists ideology will inevitably draw fire. Disproving basic ideological theories of the Communist movement could have a disastrous effect upon the Communist elite both within the Soviet orbit and in its Party appendages in the free world. The role of ideology to the continuance of the Soviet system can be seen in the Soviet attitude towards science. It is a basic Communist rule that science "and its teaching cannot be separated from the policy of the Party, which forms the vital base of the

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Soviet regime."

Marxist science is based upon a static mechanical interpretation of the universe comparable to that prevalent during the period of the mid-nineteenth Century -- the time Marx did most of his writing. The basic theories of modern science -- those which have opened up the atomic age and the research that has confirmed them -- have demonstrated that Communist scientific theory is unequivocally false. Hence, science provides grounds for a philosophical rejection of the basic factor of Marxist philosophy, namely, dialectical materialism. Yet, since dialectical materialism assures the inevitability of Communism, the Soviet leadership regards the maintenance of dialectical materialism as of more importance to them than the disadvantages that will inevitably accrue from placing scientific research in fetters.

b. The sensitiveness of the Communist rulers to the exposure of weak points in their ideological system is demonstratable. Publications like their Monat, for example, which do expose these weaknesses have been described by the Communist chieftains in Eastern Germany as "the especial effective weapon in an otherwise amateurish effort". One reason for the effectiveness of this magazine is that the intellectuals in Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain play a more important political role than they do in the United States.

c. The Titoist defection whatever its practical causes was handled by both Tito and the Cominform as an ideological question.

d. The Communist parties outside the orbit have shown themselves to be extremely vulnerable to ideological attack and ridicule. The

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ideological split within the Italian Communist Party was one of the most notable psychological events of the recent years of the cold war.

e. It must be recognized that we are dealing with a political-religious faith. It is a historical fact that faiths of this variety are subject to schisms. It is commonly accepted that what men think is true is often more important than what subsequent events prove to have been the case. Therefore, propaganda which concentrates on the discrepancies between ideas and practice and leaves untouched the ideas themselves does not represent the complete form of attack. Ideologies influence thought on many widespread fronts of human activity. They provide the frames of reference by which an immediate and specific fact can be understood. Therefore, to confront theory with practice without at the same time providing an alternative explanation for the so-called facts may result in them being altogether ignored. Another way of looking at it is to realize that ideology provides a system of mental orderliness and security for the believer. A pragmatic attack on this or that fact assumed to be at variance with the explanation offered by the ideological concept will be automatically screened out by the ideology itself. What all this boils down to is that it is very difficult to invalidate an ideological system by scientific "logical" methods.

f. The success of the ideological attack and penetration has frequently been recorded by history. The expansion of Islam, the spread of Protestantism and the legion of adherence which Moscow has won to ideology conversion are matters of common knowledge. The

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history of modern treason has demonstrated that ideology provides the entering wedge for infiltration and motivates the eventual performance of treasonable acts. Any ideology can influence any other at any level. Ideological infection can no more be confined in the lower echelons than a virus be contained in one part of the human body. Nor is there any sure-fire guarantee against any ideological infection. Add to this the fact that agents, whether wittingly or unwittingly, are more often ideologically motivated than by any other factor. The importance of ideology to many aspects of the cold war struggle appears obvious.

g. The serious, thinking people of the world should be, if they are not already, super-saturated with propaganda per se. On a worldwide basis they are almost as punch-drunk from the heavy propaganda barages they have been subjected to as the American people were with the election promises the final week of the Presidential campaign. In such an atmosphere, an appeal to reason and an appeal to basic ideas or concepts might be received by minds closed to mass propaganda approaches.

10. Comparative Assets

a. Paradoxically, materialistic communism has given a higher role to the value of ideas and its cold war offensive than has the West. Their propaganda has a much greater idea content than has ours. Not only does ideology play a greater role in the design of the overall Soviet psychological warfare program but the worldwide Agitprop organization is more suited to the distribution of ideological mate-

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rial than is our system of information and propaganda outlets.

b. They (the Soviets) have taken advantage of the weakness of book distribution systems in many places over the world by building up their own, then enjoying an insulated readership. There are reported to be some 200 communist book stores on the European continent. Communist books are making immense progress in the libraries of India and elsewhere in Asia.

c. In addition to their book publication and their book distributing system, the Communists systematically endeavored to insert communist sympathizers as "selection readers" in the book publishing industry of the free world. They have likewise sought to place many communist converts or sympathizers in the ranks of the free world book reviewers. The effect of this is that the communist ideology output has often been published unwittingly by the free world's independent book publishing industry and when published has received a carefully prepared welcome by means of the support given it by communist oriented book reviewers. This system of publication/reviews reached a high peak in the United States in the 1930's. Although it has been somewhat cut down in this country we can be certain that a comparable method is being employed in India, France and other critical peripheral areas.

d. As to our own capabilities; we have nothing that matches the comprehensive integrated communist program in the ideological field. Our ideas are inherently superior; but we have almost become self-conscious in talking about them, and have made no concerted

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effort to keep them in circulation abroad. We have little chance of gaining superiority in this field as long as we consider the "idea" side of the cold war as incidental.

IV. U. S. Doctrinal (Ideological)
Warfare Program

11.

a. The U. S. Doctrinal Warfare Program will be based on the concept that the printed word is more readily accepted without question than any other form of communication. Consequently, the central element of this program would be the production on a world-wide basis of anti-communist doctrinal material. Organizations will be utilized or created, where none exist, to insure the distribution of the materials so produced into every critical area.

b. The initial task will be to identify and create a foundation list of permanent anti-communist pro-western literature. The continuing task will be to insure that new books are written whenever openings present themselves and whenever the communists themselves write an ideological book which should be countered.

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Doctrinal warfare forms the basic core around which effective psychological warfare can be waged. Just as effective psychological warfare is propaganda plus organization, effective doctrinal warfare means "ideas" plus the organization required to put them into circulation.

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be either written or sponsored by reputable leaders whose names and ideas guarantee world-wide acceptance.

14. Type Production

Although the doctrinal program should center around hard-bound books, it should utilize a variety of public media which will serve to bring the basic ideas down to a more popular level. Included in such categories would be:

- a. magazine articles,
- b. motion pictures,
- c. international journals or newspapers -- affiliated with appropriate international organizations which could serve as a means of carrying the ideological line on a rapid, sure-fire basis (somewhat comparable to the purpose served by the Cominform journal),
- d. the program should seek to promote abroad a series of radio programs on ideological questions wherever appropriate.

15. What To Do

The following are some of the specifics which might go into a doctrinal warfare program:

- a. counter basic Soviet tenets,
- b. invite the communists to discuss ideas per se,
- c. write objective Soviet history using basic Soviet source material and previously published Soviet histories which have since been discarded by them,
- d. reprint of old Soviet texts, encyclopedias, etc., and
- e. develop or exploit independently developed ideology for

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16. Limitations

An ideological attack is not complete in itself it must be combined with many other forms of psychological persuasion. Because there is generally a time lag between the conception of an idea and its realization in practice and in daily life, there will be a time lag in the effectiveness of an ideological or doctrinal offensive. It will require time for an ideological attack to make inroads upon the opposing ideology. While it is impossible to predict whether the present situation will deteriorate into war or not, we should not fail to exploit this weapon on the conjecture that we will not have enough time for it to be effective. The final limitation is that ideological warfare success depends on one basic resource -- creative minds. There is no reason to believe that we do not have enough of them to do the job.

17. U. S. Program

a. The United States requires an integrated, comprehensive well-aimed ideological program. The chief reason why we lack such a program is probably because we have never thought it necessary to really fight in this field. Ideas rarely circulate without some conscious effort behind them. As of now, there is no ideological planning on a top priority basis in any participating department or agency. At the same time there is a good deal of what could be described as doctrinal warfare being undertaken on a rather casual basis by many elements of the government. It is not, however, identified as such, nor does a planned program designed to exploit the ideological weapon to the fullest exist. Most of what is being done touches the ideological

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field haphazardly by comparing communist practices with theoretical concepts. There has been little, if any, direct attacks made upon the fundamental ideas of the Soviet system itself.

b. Critical Areas

Our ideological approach to critical peripheral areas should be premised on the realization that the present crisis is a long-term one; that we can come through this crisis only by the greatest exertion of every effort in the cold war struggle. We should work on the assumption that we will have time to develop politically sophisticated advocates who will be in sympathy with our ideas and capable of exposing to their countrymen the underlying weaknesses of the Soviet ideological system. In consequence, programs designed to win them to our side ideologically should be pursued as a top priority effort.


13. Implementation

Our goal should be to insure:

a. that no major ideological effort of the Communists goes unchallenged,

b. that there are adequate critical analyses of every serious communist book in the doctrinal warfare field,

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d. that mechanisms for sufficient intelligence research and evaluation must be created, where they do not already exist, for the purpose of keeping abreast of the ideological element in the psychological situation, and

e. that departments and agencies having direct responsibility in the doctrinal warfare field will establish appropriate internal facilities to undertake both long-term and spot ideological operations whenever and wherever the psychological evaluation indicates the necessity.

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COMMENTS

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The attached paper was developed in conjunction with my informal association with the PSB Panel on Doctrinal Warfare. It may be of some assistance to the Panel in achieving its conclusions.

For your information, the State and Defense members of the Panel have been designated, namely, Mr. Francis Stevens and Dr. Stephen Possony and the Panel should begin its formal work within the next week or so.

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